

Vision as Going beyond the data

Vision as inference - Incorporating Prior Knowledge - Knowledge-based approaches risk being brittle or underspecified: SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM and FRAME PROBLEM

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Vision as *Going beyond the data*

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Intractable problems can be made tractable using priors such as "objects cannot just disappear, they more likely occlude each other" or "head like objects are usually found on top of body like objects".

Bayesian priors provide one means to do this, since the learning (or specification) of metaphysical principles (truths about the nature of the world) can steer the integration of evidence appropriately, making an intractable problem soluble.







Decisions under uncertainty

- the nature of the data or signals available
- the inherent problem of classifying or recognising them
- the unpredictability of the future
- the fact that objects and events have associated likelihoods of occurrence (depending on context)

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- the uncertainty of causation
- the inherent incompleteness or imperfection of processing
- possible undecidability of a problem, given all available data
- the "ill-posed" nature of many tasks
- inherent trade-offs such as speed versus accuracy

Decisions under uncertainty

Examples of decisions-under-uncertainty in vision:

- Medical diagnosis; radiology: Is this a tumour? Does the cost of a possible False Alarm (taking a biopsy, frightening the patient unnecessarily) exceed the cost of possibly missing an early diagnosis? What should you do if the odds are 99% that it is just a benign cyst; but if it is a tumour, missing it now could be fatal?
- Military decision-making: a plane is seen approaching your aircraft carrier very low on the horizon and at high speed. Is it friend or foe? How should the costs of the two possible types of error (shooting down one of your own planes, vs allowing the whole aircraft carrier to be sunk) be balanced against their relative probabilities, when making your decision?

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Probabilities: Review

Product Rule:

$$p(A, B) =$$
 "joint probability of both A and B"
= $p(A|B)p(B)$

or equivalently, = p(B|A)p(A)

Sum Rule:

If event A is conditionalized on a number of other events B, then the total probability of A is the sum of its joint probabilities with all B:

$$p(A) = \sum_{B} p(A, B) = \sum_{B} p(A|B)p(B)$$

$$p(H|D) = \frac{p(D|H)p(H)}{p(D)}$$

The Bayesian view

$$posterior = \frac{likelihood * prior}{evidence}$$

Iterative integration of new evidence: posteriors become new priors

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The Bayesian view

Examples of useful priors in vision:

- Some objects and events are far more likely than others
- Matter cannot just disappear, but does routinely become occluded
- Objects rarely change their surface colour

• Uniform texturing on a complex surface shape is more likely than highly non-uniform texturing on a simple shape

• Rigid rotation in three dimensions is a ``better explanation" for deforming boundaries than actual boundary deformations in the object itself

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Statistical decision theory

The degree of match between two feature vectors must be computed and formally evaluated to make a decision of "same" or "different." Almost always, there is some similarity between "different" patterns, and some dissimilarity between "same" patterns. This creates a <u>decision environment</u> with four possible outcomes:

- 1. <u>Hit</u> (True accept): Actually same; decision "same".
- 2. <u>Miss</u> (False reject): Actually same; decision "different".
- 3. <u>False Alarm</u> (False accept): Actually different; decision "same".
- 4. Correct Reject (True reject): Actually different; decision "different".

We would like to maximise the probability of outcomes 1 and 4, because these are correct decisions. We would like to minimise the probability of outcomes 2 and 3, because these are incorrect decisions ("Type II" and "Type I" errors).

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Statistical decision theory

We can adjust our decision threshold (become more liberal or more conservative) to reflect the costs and benefits of the four possible outcomes. But adjusting the decision threshold has coupled effects on the four outcomes:

- Increasing the "Hit" rate will also increase the "False Alarm" rate.
- Decreasing the "Miss" rate will also decrease the "Correct Reject" rate.

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These considerations illustrate what might be called the "Primary Law of Pattern Recognition":

The key factor is the relation between within-class variability and between-class variability. Pattern recognition can be performed reliably only when the between-class variability is larger than the within-class variability.

Application: Skin Colour Histograms

- Skin has a very small range of (intensity independent) colours, and little texture
 - Compute colour measure, check if colour is in this range, check if there is little texture (median filter)
 - Get class conditional densities (histograms), priors from data (counting)
- Classifier is

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- if $p(skin|\boldsymbol{x}) > \theta$, classify as skin
- if $p(skin|\boldsymbol{x}) < \theta$, classify as not skin













Define the <u>prior</u> probabilities $P(C_1)$ and $P(C_2)$ as their relative proportions (summing to 1). If we had to guess which character had appeared without our even seeing it, we would always just guess the one with the higher prior probability. Thus since in fact an 'a' is about 4 times more frequent than a 'b' in English, and these are the only two cases in this two-class inference problem, we would set P(a) = 0.8 and P(b) = 0.2.



$$P(x) = \sum_{k=1}^{2} P(x|C_k) P(C_k) \label{eq:prod}$$

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Bayesian pattern classifiers

$$P(x) = \sum_{k=1}^{2} P(x|C_k)P(C_k)$$
Now we have everything we need to apply Bayes' Rule to calculate the like-
lihood of either class membership, given some observation x, factoring in the
prior probabilities $P(C_k)$, the unconditional probability $P(x)$ of the observed
data, and the likelihood of the data given either of the classes, $P(x|C_k)$. The
likelihood of class C_k given the data x, is the posterior probability $P(C_k|x)$:

$$P(C_k|x) = \frac{P(x|C_k)P(C_k)}{P(x)}$$
(17)

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$$P(C_k|x) = \frac{P(x|C_k)P(C_k)}{P(x)}$$
(17)

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to the class with the highest posterior probability. Assign x to class C_k if:

 $P(C_k|x) > P(C_j|x) \quad \forall j \neq k$

Since the denominator in Bayes' Rule (equation 17) is independent of C_k , we can rewrite this ${\it minimum\ misclassification\ criterion\ simply\ as:}$

> $P(x|C_k)P(C_k) > P(x|C_j)P(C_j)$ $\forall j \neq k$

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Discriminant functions and decision boundaries

If some set of functions $y_k(x)$ of the data x are constructed, one function for each class C_k , such that classification decisions are made by assigning an observation x to class C_k if

$$y_k(x) > y_j(x) \quad \forall j \neq k,$$

those functions $y_k(x)$ are called <u>discriminant functions</u>. The decision boundaries between data regions R_j and R_k are defined by those loci in the (normally multi-dimensional) data x at which $y_k(x) = y_j(x)$. A natural choice for discriminant functions would be the posterior probabilities:

$$y_k(x) = P(C_k|x)$$

Equivalently since the denominator P(x) in Bayes' Rule is independent of k, we could choose

 $y_k(x) = P(x|C_k)P(C_k)$

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